Botox 4 the brain

“Toward a More Fruitful Debate About Enhancement,” Review

Toward A More Fruitful Debate

In this essay, Erik Parens wants to “illuminate the structure of the debate” in neuroethics, particularly in the issues

related with “the enhancement of human traits and capacities” (181). He rightly thinks that if “we get better at noticing the structure of the debate about enhancement, we might engage in a more fruitful debate” (180). He points out three important issues.

First, he shows how critics and proponents of enhancement technology both seek to be authentic human beings. He states, “[M]any in fact are striving to live up to the moral ideal of authenticity. Whether or not they achieve it, they aspire to find self-fulfillment and to become who they really are” (182). Unfortunately, critics and proponent differ in their understanding of authenticity. He writes, “[T]he knockers and boosters –or critics and proponents–of ‘enhancement technologies’ share the moral ideal of authenticity, but they understand authenticity differently: they have different views about what it consists in, and thus about how to achieve it” (183). For the critics, enhancement can be a threat to who we really are. They would worry that “mood-alternating drugs will separate us from the actions and experiences that normally accompany those moods . . . we will be separated from who we really are and from how the world really is” (184). On the other hand, for the proponents, enhancement can help us be more authentic. They sees enhancement not as “a threat to authenticity, but rather as tools that can facilitate our authentic efforts at self-discovery and self-creation” (186).This disagreement about authenticity comes from a disagreement raised by two different frameworks used to look at the world, which Parens analyses in the second part of his essay.

Second, he looks at the two different frameworks used by critics and proponents. This section echoes one of his earlier essays. In “Creativity, gratitude, and the enhancement debate” and in this essay, Parens distinguishes between two philosophical/ethical frameworks that “people seem to come to the academic debate about enhancement technologies.” The first framework desires “to mend and transform ourselves and the world.” Because of this desire to create and change creation, Parens names this framework: Creativity. The second framework takes a different approach. It reminds us that we are not creators and that life is a gift. This view, which he calls Gratitude, tends to let nature be. He writes, “According to Genesis, and it seems to me much of Judaism, our responsibility is not merely to be grateful and remember that we are not the creators of the whole. It is also our responsibility to use our creativity to mend and transform ourselves and the world. As far as I can tell, Genesis and Judaism do not exhort us to choose between gratitude and creativity. Rather . . . it is our job to figure out how to maintain that fertile tension, making sure that neither stance gets more than its share” (189).

Third, Parens discusses two cases to illustrate how critics and proponents can learn from each other. He discusses a problem for an honest proponent and then for an honest critic. First, he demonstrates that in some cases a pill (or enhancement) might not foster authenticity, but hinders it. He points out the example of the creation of a pill who could engender the “perception of intimacy” in order to encourage a woman to experience the desire for sexual intercourse. He rightly thinks that “honest proponents will acknowledge that the idea of a pill that would, in the absence of genuine intimacy, create the perception of intimacy is perplexing” (193). Indeed, the person taking this pill would not live truly or authentically. Second, he demonstrates how, in some cases, enhancement might help someone to become who she/he truly is. He gives the examples of transgenders, to whom surgeries enable them to change their anatomies in order to become more authentic. He writes, “Different from the ‘pill of intimacy,’ which undermines the purpose of achieving genuine intimacy and relationship, [transgender]’s surgeries seem to promote that purpose” (195).

Parens is really helpful in distinguishing both frameworks used in the enhancement debate in neuroethics. Instead of focusing on major differences they might have, he tries to make them work together. He argues that the biblical story and Judaism contains both frameworks. He acknowledges that “it is our job to figure out how to maintain that fertile tension” between Creativity and Gratitude (189). Unfortunately, he does not reflect on how we could have those two frameworks working together. It would be helpful to understand the cultural mandate in order to understand in what ways humans are allowed or able to alter nature. Furthermore, the Fall has not only affected human creativity but has also forced us to be innovative in order to fight sickness and diseases. One will need to take this in consideration in order to make those two frameworks work together.

Parens is also right in pointing out that both critics and proponents seek to become authentic human beings. The idea of authenticity raises some problems which religious people and theologians have struggle with for a long time. As Sandel writes in The Case Against Perfection, “To grapple with the ethics of enhancement, we need to confront question largely lost from view in the modern world–question about the moral status of nature, and about the proper stance of human beings towards the world. Since these questions verge on theology, modern philosophers and political theorist tend to shrink from them. But our new powers of biotechnology make the unavoidable” (Sandel, 9). I suppose religious people also desire to become authentic human beings, but differ about what is authenticity and how one should achieve it. One may wonder if someone should be encouraged to take an enhancer in order to become fully human.

Scientists and Theologians are Playing God

In his article “Playing God,” in Human Enhancement, C. A. J. Coady looks at “the accusation of playing God” (179) when one is altering creation (nature). This accusation is often made “against secular agents, such as scientists, and very often made by clergy and theologians” (179). But first, Coady points out the positive and negative aspects of three Christian stances towards Creation: 1) dominion, 2) stewardship, and 3) co-creation.  He rightly points out that “the first two have been prominent in debates about the role of Christianity in promoting what many have seen as bad attitudes to the natural environment” (157). However, he does remind us that some Christians have followed the example of St Francis of Assisi. Coady writes, “Instead of viewing God as handing the created world to humans for domination and exploitation, the picture is one of God giving humans the task of caring for the creation on God’s behalf” (157). His critique continues, “The stewardship model tends to the opposite faults of the dominion model. Where the latter seems to ignore or fail to acknowledge properly the respect that is due to the non-human world, the stewards seem to have too passive attitude to what there is” (159). Codly then writes that “theologians have been moved to the metaphor of co-creation as a more adequate picture of the relation between God and man” (160). This might be problematic as “the distance between God and creatures” (161) might disappear. He concludes this first part, “It seems to me that all three pictures have an element of truth in them and that the dialogue between them exhibits the tensions that need to be kept in view by believers in negotiating the mystery of humanity’s place in the created order” (161).

Coady is really helpful by distinguishing those three Christian stances towards creation. However, while the stewards might be indeed too passive towards the world (159), if one considers the Christian idea of the Fall, it seems that even the stewards would know that the evil and suffering need to be fought against. Thus this would encourage the stewards to be less passivie. Moreover, the attitude towards Creation is not only reflected in Genesis 3 (which seems to be what Coady mainly refers to), but in the rest of the biblical narrative also. Just the idea that our story starts in a garden and ends up in a city points towards some changes in Creation.

Second, Coady looks at reasons the non-religious world has been accused of “playing God.” He defines playing God as “going beyond the limits we have in these three aspects, acting in ways that ignore the in-built constraints on our knowledge, power, and benevolence” (163). The critique of playing God is the critique towards an attitude that desires omnipotence, omniscience and benevolence (characteristic usually given to God). He reminds us of the ecological disaster that we brought by relying too much on our own understanding (164). He writes, “The greatest achievement of science and the prospects they open up for us can lead us to an exaggerated sense of what we know, to misplaced confidence in our powers to change the world and blindness to our own moral deficiencies” (164). This clearly lacks “a degree of humility about how much we now know” (164). Moreover, because of our human limitations, we “do well to be on guard about exaggerated claims, public relations hype, and insufficient efforts to discover what can be known about effects and implications” (165). He concludes this section by reminding us that, “The Critique of playing God is primarily a criticism of an attitude and only derivatively of a program or proposal” (165). This attitude might “embody an unjustified confidence in knowledge, power, and virtue beyond what can reasonably be allowed to human beings” (165).

Third, Coady analyses cases “in which the intentions of the agent are benevolent, but are criticized for seeking to transcend legitimate limits on what it is to be human” (166). He points example of “playing God with the genes,” “Changing Human Nature,” and “Damaging autonomy.” I will write more on this section later.

He concludes:

Since the accusation of playing God is invariably made against secular agents, such as scientist, and very often made by clergy and theologians, it is worth reflecting on the possibility that the charge could be turned in the opposite direction. After all, it is often religious authority that claims to be representing God and God’s purposes. Have the Churches been playing God in the crisis created by new technologies? (179)

He adds, “The temptation to act in ways that ignore or make light of the in-built constraints on human knowledge, power, and benevolence is certainly one to which all humans are prone, including bishop, theologians, and priests” (179).

The age of enhancement

The age of enhancement

Here is a great article I read this morning about “a cornucopia of drugs [that] will soon be on sale to improve everything from our memories to our trust in others.”

While a lot of the promises for a better world seem attractive, I wonder if our quest to master our own body and brain will produce some side effects that are still unseen. One can think of how the human quest to master nature has brought us in a big environmental mess. I think that neuroethics could probably learn a lot from environmental ethics. It seems that the question, “How far should we be able to modify our environment?” reflects the question, “How far should we be able to modify ourselves?”

Human Enhancement: What should be permitted?

Human Enhancement: What should be permitted?

Human Enhancement: What should be permitted?

20-21 October 2009, Geneva, Switzerland

Biomedical science is increasingly yielding technologies that can be used to enhance the capacities of healthy people, as well as to treat disease. This two-day workshop will aim to advance the debate on the ethics of human enhancement by considering

(1) What enhancements are likely to become possible?

(2) What enhancements will be ethically permissible?

(3) What enhancements should be legally permitted?

(4) What criteria should be used to answer 2 and 3?

See more here: http://www.brocher.ch/pages/sympvenir_details.asp?id=15

Will Bruce Willis save us from neuroethical headaches?

Surrogates

On September 25, 2009 except to see Bruce Willis save us all, in the upcoming movie: Surrogates. From the movie trailer (watch below), it seems that issues of brain enhancement, transhumanism and gnosticism are back on the screen. This time the setting is in the year 2017, where humans live their lives through robotic bodies. Will the technology be ready in 2017 to accomplish what the trailer portrays? Will Bruce sacrifice himself to save us all, once again?

Michael Sandel, 2009 Reith Lectures

Michael Sandel

In the 2009 Reith Lectures, Professor Michael Sandel argues, in “Genetics and Morality,” that as a society we should not seek genetic enhancement (outside of therapeutic enhancement), because to do so is to lose the appreciation of the giftedness of life, humility, solidarity, and responsibility. Even though the lecture focuses on genetic enhancement, much of what has been shared can be applied to others form of enhancement (biotechnological enhancement, neurological enhancement). What might help to answer a question concerning the difference between the use of botox, gel, and braces is that we need to make a difference not only between therapy and enhancement, but also between the use of an external object (umbrella, medicament . . .)to help a person and engineering a new person with various means.

Furthermore, Sandel acknowledges that much of this discussion is theological in character. He states:

“In order to grabble with the ethics of enhancement, we need to confront questions largely lost from view in the modern world, questions about the proper stance of human beings towards the given world. Since this questions verge on theology, modern philosophers and political theorists tend to shrink from them, but our new powers of biotechnology make these questions unavoidable” (See the recording at 6 minutes 20).